


# บทที่ 5 IMPLICATIONS OF QUANTUM COMPUTING ON NETWORK SECURITY



ผู้ช่วยศาสตราจารย์จุฑาวุฒิ จันทรมานะ

หลักสูตรวิทยาศาสตรบัณฑิต สาขาวิชาวิทยาการคอมพิวเตอร์  
คณะวิทยาศาสตร์และเทคโนโลยี มหาวิทยาลัยสวนดุสิต

# Security-Concerning Quantum Algorithms

- Shor's Algorithm:

- factorizes large numbers
- with quantum compute, Shor's algorithm threatens the security of classical Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) including:
  - Diffie-Hellman (DH)
  - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and
  - Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)
- The key exchange is at greatest risk


$$N = \text{Prime 1} \times \text{Prime 2}$$

- Grover's Algorithm

- searches an unstructured database (or an unordered list) for a specific result
- With quantum compute, Grover's algorithm will threaten the security of AES
- Immediate recommendation is to increase key sizes




# Y2Q, CRQC and SNDL

- **Years to Quantum (Y2Q)** refers to the unknown number of years before there is are **Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC)**
- A CRQC can compute prime factorizations and discrete logarithms in polynomial time by Shor's algorithm, thereby rendering public key algorithms all but obsolete
- However, an adversary can capture network traffic *today* in the hopes of decrypting it *later* with a CRQC; this is a **Store Now, Decrypt Later (SNDL)** type of attack, and means that sensitive data is vulnerable *right now* to future quantum threats
  - Sometimes this method is also referred to as **Harvest Now Decrypt Later (HNDL)**



# Grover's Algorithm: Classic vs. Quantum



Classic  
Search

$f(\text{"red ball"})$  ► “Position 5” Worst Case:  $N$  searches

Quantum  
Search

$f(\text{"Pos 2?"})$  ► “False”

⋮


$f(\text{"Pos 5?"})$  ► “True”

Worst Case:  $\sqrt{N}$  searches



- Grover's algorithm uses amplitude amplification to return the correct result with high probability
- As such, with quantum parallelism and interference management, Grover's algorithm becomes quadratically faster than a classical algorithm

# Grover Quantum Circuit






# How many Qubits are required to Break RSA and AES?

- Experts estimate that:
  - RSA-2048 requires a quantum computer with **4,096 logically-corrected qubits** to be broken
  - AES-256 requires a quantum computer with **6,681 logically-corrected qubits** to be broken



# How Many Physical Qubits are Required to Produce a Logically-Corrected Qubit?

- Qubits are notoriously fragile and extremely sensitive to the environment and can easily lose coherence (state)
- The logical state of a qubit can be spread over many physical qubits to achieve **Quantum Error Correction**
- In March 2023, Google realized a logically-corrected qubit with just **49** physical qubits
- In December 2023, Harvard scientists achieved the same with just **48** qubits





So, really...


How many Qubits are required to Break RSA and AES?

- Let's assume 50 physical qubits for one logically-corrected qubit
- Experts estimate that:
  - RSA-2048 requires a quantum computer with 4,096 logically-corrected qubits to be broken
    - $(4096 * \sim 50)$  200,800 physical qubits
  - AES-256 requires a quantum computer with 6,681 logically-corrected qubits to be broken
    - $(6681 * 334,050)$  334,050 physical qubits
- But remember:
  - Quantum computers are *increasing* in size, while
  - Quantum Error Correction circuits are *decreasing* in size






# How Far Off Is That?



<https://newsroom.ibm.com/2023-12-04-IBM-Debuts-Next-Generation-Quantum-Processor-IBM-Quantum-System-Two,-Extends-Roadmap-to-Advance-Era-of-Quantum-Utility>

# How Many Y2Q?

- Cloud Security Alliance:
  - April 14, 2030
- Global Risk Institute:
  - ~50% of experts predict 15 years
- White House / NIST
  - “in the not-too-distant future”




<https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/press-releases/2022/03/09/cloud-security-alliance-sets-countdown-clock-to-quantum/>

<https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/2023-quantum-threat-timeline-report/>

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/>

# Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)





# Secure Key Import Protocol (SKIP)

